Engagements, grammars, and the public : From the liberal grammar to individual interests by Eranti, Veikko
1	
Engagements, grammars, and the public: From the liberal 
grammar to individual interests 
This is the post print version of the article, which has been published in European	
Journal	of	Cultural	and	Political	Sociology	5(1-2), 42-65. 	2018	Veikko	Eranti	(University	of	Tampere),	veikko.eranti@gmail.com	/	@veikkoeranti	Please	find	the	published	version	of	this	paper	at	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23254823.2018.1442733	
Abstract	This	article	explores	the	role	of	individual	interests	within	the	pragmatic	sociology	of	engagements	expounded	by	Laurent	Thévenot.	He	developed	the	idea	of	multiple	regimes	of	engaging	with	the	world	–	cognitive	models	of	information-processing	and	what	kind	of	good	is	engaged	in	different	situations.	In	this	article	I	argue	that	the	way	the	sociology	of	engagements	is	currently	formulated	does	not	sufficiently	allow	for	analysing	public	participation	and	disputes	in	situations	where	individual	interests	play	a	crucial	role	in	public	debates.	The	article	presents	a	slight	reformulation	of	what	Thévenot	calls	the	grammar	of	
individuals	in	a	liberal	public	(sic),	based	on	a)	an	understanding	of	how	individual	interests	relate	to	the	common	good	and	general	will,	b)	the	constitution	of	legitimate	actors	within	polities,	and	c)	the	separation	between	the	levels	of	generality	and	publicity.	This	reformulation	might	be	called	the	grammar	of	individual	interests,	clarifying	and	simplifying	earlier	terminology	.	
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Introduction:	pruning	for	the	public	eye	Laurent	Thévenot’s	pragmatic	sociology	provides	us	with	a	good	set	of	tools	for	understanding	how	disputes	and	conflicts	can	be	solved	peacefully	in	a	complex	world	–	a	toolkit	that	can	be	used	cross-culturally	in	a	comparative	manner.	But	the	role	of	individual	interests	has	thus	far	been	underdeveloped	in	this	framework.	This	article	aims	at	clarifying	the	role	of	individual	interests	–	‘the	grammar	of	individuals	in	a	liberal	public	‘	(Thévenot	2014,	2015)–	within	what	is	often	called	French	pragmatic	sociology,	the	sociology	of	engagements,	and	justification	theory.		Laurent	Thévenot’s	efforts	–	including	his	earlier	works	with	Luc	Boltanski	–	towards	understanding	how	individuals	coordinate	their	lives	and	resolve	conflicts	in	complex	societies,	has	given	rise	to	many	fruitful	empirical	analyses	of	the	use	of	the	common	good	in	public	debates	(Ylä-Anttila	&	Luhtakallio	2016),	of	the	populist	appropriation	of	emotionally	charged	commonplaces	(Ylä-Anttila	2016),	and	also	of	the	ways	in	which	different	valuations	can	be	used	within	a	single	conflict	(Eranti	2017).	Justification	theory	(Boltanski	&	Thévenot	2006[1999])	and	the	Sociology	of	Engagements	(Thévenot	2007,	2015)	offer	us	a	finely	nuanced	set	of	concepts	that	can	be	operationalised	to	understand	how	individuals	connect	to	the	material	world,	coordinate	action,	resolve	conflicts	–	and	build	commonality	with	other	people.	Justification	theory,	based	on	the	idea	that	there	is	a	limited	number	of	ways	of	constructing	the	common	good	that	are	used	by	actors	in	discussions	and	in	conflicts,	lends	itself	naturally	to	the	analysis	of	democratic	participation.	But	if	we	wish	to	use	the	broader	sociology	of	engagements	(which	incorporates	ways	of	acting	that	are	not	based	on	the	common	good)	in	analysing	participation,	disputes,	and	confrontations	in	analysing	public	debates,	some	clarifications	and	developments	to	the	theoretical	foundations	are	needed.	 This	is	certainly	true	for	the	grammars	of	commonality	and	regimes	of	
engagement	presented	by	Thévenot	(2001,	2007,	2011,	2014,	2015),	a	typology	of	action	grounded	in	the	pragmatist	idea	of	different	ways	in	which	individual	actors	relate	to	the	(physical)	world.	There	are	three	(main)	types	of	engagement	with	the	world:	one	based	on	public	justifications,	one	based	on	familiar,	close	affinities	and	one	based	on	individual	interests.	When	these	three	engagements	operate	in	public,	that	is,	on	the	level	of	political	argumentation,	Thévenot	(2014,	2015)	calls	them	grammars	of	commonality.	The	grammar	incorporating	individual	interests,	‘Individuals	in	a	liberal	public’,	is	built	upon	the	regime	of	
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the	plan	–	on	the	codified	intentionality	of	actors	and	their	capacity	to	project	their	will	into	the	future.	While	this	definition	has	merits,	it	also	limits	analytic	potential	in	situations	that	resemble	public	political	discussion	more	than	private	arrangements.	In	this	paper	I	argue	that	without	partial	reworking,	the	theory	does	not	adequately	capture	political	claims	and	critique	based	on	individual	interests.		Many	strands	of	social	theory	start	from	the	assumption	that	individual	interests	are	what	drive	people,	and	that	thus	they	are	always	the	most	legitimate	arguments	one	can	make.	The	value	of	the	pragmatic	sociology	approach	is	that	it	can	potentially	treat	individual	interests	as	just	one	possible	way	of	presenting	critique	and	solving	conflicts.	Here	I	construct	a	version	of	pragmatic	sociology	that	simultaneously	retains	the	commitment	to	analysing	common	goods	and	ways	of	conflict	resolution,	and	brings	the	role	of	individual	interests	on	a	par	with	the	other	grammars.		Some	of	the	critiques	presented	here	use	ideas	from	the	study	of	deliberative	democracy	and	participation	to	highlight	the	problematic	places	within	this	theoretical	framework.	My	aim	is	to	provide	alternative	interpretations,	especially	about	the	role	of	individual	interests,	that	are	needed	to	use	the	sociology	of	engagements	naturally	as	a	theory	of	disputation	within	diverse	democratic	situations.	The	article	focuses	on	using	pragmatic	sociology	in	the	context	of	democratic	participation	and	public	disputes,	which	is	not	the	only	way	to	interpret	or	to	operationalise	the	theory,	but	nonetheless	is	the	one	that	promises	the	greatest	empirical	benefits.	This	move	from	the	philosophical	and	anthropological	levels	of	the	original	theoretical	works	towards	more	public-oriented	political	sociology	has	already	been	carried	out	in	many	empirical	studies	(Eranti	2017,	Luhtakallio,	2012,	Ylä-Anttila	2010b	and	Tuukka	Ylä-Anttila	2016,	Ylä-Anttila	&	Luhtakallio	2016,	Gladarev	&	Lonkila	2013,	Ylä-Anttila	&	Kukkonen	2015,	Ylä-Anttila	et	al.	forthcoming,	Eranti	2014,	Eranti	2016).	This	paper	aims	at	doing	some	pruning	around	the	relation	between	justifications,	individual	interests	and	the	general	will,	in	the	context	of	public	participation	and	discussion.	Examples	and	quotations	are	taken	from	a	participatory	urban	planning	process	in	Helsinki,	better	detailed	in	my	earlier	work	(Eranti	2017	and	2014).	How	does	the	concept	of	legitimacy	(in	the	sense	of	being	accepted	as	argumentation	within	a	polity)	work	with	comments	not	based	on	the	common	good?	To	answer	this	question,	we	must	also	engage	with	questions	of	commonality	and	generalisability:	the	grammar	of	‘individuals	in	a	
liberal	public’	(as	presented	by	Thévenot	2014,	2015)	is	seen	as	being	on	a	lesser	level	of	
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publicity	and	on	a	lower	level	of	abstraction	than	the	grammar	of	public	justification.	Justifications	operate	on	the	level	of	principles,	of	abstract	common	goods	put	to	the	test	in	particular	situations.	Because	these	goods	are	abstract,	and	by	definition	based	on	common	humanity,	they	are	available	for	everyone	as	a	repertoire	of	actions	and	rhetoric	(see	Swidler,	1986;	Silber,	2003).	If	the	aim	is	to	understand	how	argumentation	by	reference	to	individual	interests		is	used	in	disputes,	we	need	to	understand	the	limits	of	the	legitimacy	concerned	–	and	in	order	to	do	this,	we	must	think	these	aspects	of	the	‘grammar	of	individuals	in	a	liberal	
public’	anew.	I	propose	that	this	grammar	should	be	called	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	to	make	its	constituting	feature	more	evident,	and	to	distance	it	from	reference	to	the	unclear	and	polysemic	concept	of	liberalism.1		The	next	section	starts	by	analysing	the	role	of	the	common	good	and	the	general	will,	through	presenting	key	ideas	of	justification	theory	and	their	relation	to	pragmatist	creativity.	Then	I	proceed	to	the	idea	of	multiple	ways	of	engaging	with	the	world,	and	how	they	are	operationalised	in	public	as	grammars	of	commonality.	The	rest	of	the	paper	is	devoted	to	analysing	the	role	of	individual	interests	within	this	theoretical	framework.	Concluding	remarks	take	the	form	of	questions	about	the	nature	of	the	polity,	and	the	nature	of	politicisation	in	a	world	where	arguments	based	solely	on	individual	interests	are	legitimate.	
Public	justifications	and	the	general	will	In	On	Justification,	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	(2006)	present	six	orders	of	worth	–	common	good-based	justifications	which	can	be	and	are	deployed	to	solve	conflict	situations	without	degenerating	into	more	primitive	means	of	resolution.	These	are	Market	worth,	where	evaluation	is	based	on	monetary	worth;	Industrial	worth,	in	which	efficiency	and	measurability	are	valued;	Civic	worth,	where	the	emphasis	is	on	solidarity	and	collectivity;	the	
order	of	Fame,	where	popularity,	fame	and	renown	are	valued;	Inspiration,	in	which	evaluation	is	based	on	grace,	spirituality	and	individual	creativity;	and	Domestic	worth,	valuing	tradition,	esteem	and	somewhat	hierarchical	arrangements.	A	later	addition,	Green	
worth,	places	value	on	biodiversity	and	nature	(see	Lafaye	&	Thévenot	1993).	
																																																								1	What	I	propose	here	is	to	rename	a	theoretical	category,	while	at	the	same	time	reworking	some	of	the	ideas	included.	Whether	it	would	be	more	suitable	to	understand	what	I	present	here	as	a	distinct	category	in	itself,	while	keeping	the	original	formulation	unchanged,	is	a	question	I	leave	to	future	debate.	
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What	are	these	justifications?	Human	beings	have	a	critical	capacity	–	a	capacity	to	justify	their	positions,	to	challenge	existing	structures	and	situations	(Boltanski	2011,	Boltanski	&	Thevenot	2006,	1999).	If	this	capacity	were	completely	creative,	flexible,	and	free,	arguments	would	often	be	complete	gibberish,	and	compromise	between	parties	in	a	dispute	would	be	all	but	impossible	–	as	would	sustaining	a	common	society.2	Justifications	can	be	seen	as	shared	sets	of	cultural	repertoires	(Silber	2003,	Swidder	1986).	This	means	that	they	must	be	recognisable	by	others,	lest	communicating	(both	in	the	normal	sense,	and	in	the	specific	way	Thévenot	uses	it	in	2011,	2015:	making	things	common)	should	become	impossible.	The	critical	capacity	arises	especially	in	moments	of	crisis,	when	the	status	quo	is	disrupted	(Boltanski	&	Thévenot	1999).	This	crisis	can	be	seen	as	a	special	case	of	situation,	as	used	by	pragmatists	(Joas	1996,	Dewey	2006[1927],	Kilpinen	2009):	a	situation	occurs	when	actors	have	to	make	choices,	either	to	follow	known	paths,	or	to	adopt	creative	strategies.	All	meaningful,	non-routine	action	happens	in	these	kinds	of	situations.	This	leads	Hans	Joas	to	classify	pragmatism	as	a	theory	of	situated	creative	action	(1996:132).	The	special	emphasis	of	this	kind	of	pragmatist	creativity	shows	when	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	are	compared	to	Bourdieu	(Boltanski	2011),	which	was	their	initial	point	of	divergence:	rather	than	following	clear-cut	paths	of	action	deriving	from	habitus	or	class	position,	actors	have	a	critical	capacity	of	their	own	(for	more	on	situated,	creative	political	action,	see	Eranti	2016:	14-26).		 In	these	kinds	of	crisis	situations,	the	actors	will	take	recourse	to	certain	cultural	repertoires	(Swidler	1986,	Silber	2003).	These	repertoires	are	dynamic	and	local,	but	not	random.	They	can	be	called	institutionalised	habits	(Ylä-Anttila	2010a,).		As	noted	earlier,	the	six	justifications	presented	in	On	Justification	(Boltanski	&	Thévenot	2006)	are	cultural	repertoires	of	evaluation:	each	order	of	worth	forms	a	scale,	with	which	things,	people	and	arrangements	can	be	evaluated	based	on	a	shared	principle	(cf.	Lamont	2012,	Lamont	&	Thévenot	2000,	with	On	justification,	140-141;	see	also	Eranti	2017).		 The	model	of	an	order	of	worth,	presented	in	On	Justification,	includes	more	than	just	the	common	good,	or	a	principle	of	evaluation.	Individuals,	as	well	as	non-human	things	and	arrangements,	can	be	ordered	according	to	a	set	of	principles	of	the	common	good.	These	orderings	are	always	temporary;	they	change	according	to	situation	and	according	to	the																																																									2	Thévenot	in	his	later	works	builds	a	picture	of	a	pluralistic,	not	an	atomistic	society	–	and	this	difference	is	related	to	having	a	discrete	but	large	number	of	possible	justifications.		
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arrangement	of	material	objects.	This	ordering	is	what	allows	us	to	resolve	conflicts.	Since	the	basis	of	the	ordering	is	supposed	to	be	shared	and	generally	understood,	all	parties	to	the	conflict	can,	once	the	ordering	is	decided	upon,	agree	on	it	as	the	basis	of	the	compromise	or	solution.	The	importance	of	material	objects	and	qualified	non-human	actors	as	belonging	to	the	justifications,	as	well	as	the	empirical	focus,	distinguish	justification	theory	and	thus	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	from	Walzer,	another	author	who	developed	similar	ideas	about	the	communal	and	disputed	nature	of	the	common	good	(Ricœur	2000,	86,	Wagner	1999).	To	understand	how	the	idea	of	individual	interests,	as	a	legitimate	basis	for	conflict-resolution	and	a	starting	point	for	democratic	participation,	relate	to	the	framework	of	justifications	based	on	the	common	good	that	has	been	presented,	we	need	to	take	a	closer	look	at	the	civic	order	of	worth.		In	the	civic	order,	the	relevant	questions	are	those	of	solidary	and	egalitarian	principles.	In	the	civic	order,	where	the	evaluation	is	based	on	collective	interest	and	solidarity,	legitimate	arguments	are	those	based	on	justice	and	fairness	on	the	collective	level,	not	from	the	perspective	of	individual	rights.	In	the	civic	world,	collectives	are	valuable	as	such	(On	Justification,	185-186).	The	civic	generality	is	one	where	all	relations,	if	they	are	to	be	considered	legitimate,	must	be	made	publicly	known	with	‘reference	to	the	collective	entities	(…)	that	ground	their	general	interests’	(On	Justification:	11).3	Here,	the	common	good	does	not	arise	as	a	sum	of	individual	wills,	but	rather	as	a	collective	thing	in	itself,	above	those	private	interests.	This,	while	most	evident	in	the	civic	order,	holds	true	for	all	of	the	orders	of	worth.	Each	order	of	worth	is	dependent	on	a	definition	of	a	common	good,	and	while	this	is	not	the	same	as	being	dependent	on	the	concept	of	general	will,	it	leans	in	that	direction:	it	is	hard	to	think	of	the	common	good	without	some	conception	of	a	unified	body	politic,	without	something	that	puts	the	‘common’	into	the	common	good.	This	is	how	the	general	will	manifests	itself.		All	orders	of	worth	in	On	Justification	are	based,	in	addition	to	ethnographic	fieldwork	and	interviews,	on	historical	and	canonical	philosophical	texts.	The	historical	text	for	the	civic	worth	is	in	Rousseau’s	The	Social	Contract	(1762).	In	this	work,	the	will	of	a	Sovereign	(a	monarch,	or	perhaps	The	People	in	the	streets)	acts	as	the	model	for	the	general	will,	rising	(quite	literally)	above	individual	concerns.	This	line	of	thinking	permeates	all	
																																																								3	See	also	Ricœur,	2000.	
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orders	of	worth.4	Within	public	justifications,	all	evaluation	is	thus	dependent	on	a	shared	conception	of	what	is	good,	of	evaluative	thinking	that	starts	from	the	community,	or	general	will,	and	not	from	the	individual.		 Boltanski	and	Thévenot	focus	on	interactions	between	people	and	objects	on	the	abstract	and	personal	level	–	on	theoretical	texts	and	in	interaction	situations.	Their	focus	is	not	on	public	justification.	Actually,	in	their	work,	the	concept	of	the	public	hardly	figures	at	all,	even	though	some	elements	of	justification	are	stated	to	happen	within	the	context	of	a	Habermas-style	public	sphere	(Habermas	1991,	Boltanski	2011,	Lamont	&	Thévenot	2000	–	also	in	On	Justification).	Luhtakallio	and	Ylä-Anttila	(Ylä-Anttila	&	Luhtakallio	2016,	Luhtakallio	2012,	Ylä-Anttila	2010b)	have	developed	operationalisations	of	the	theory	focused	on	explicitly	analysing	public	justification.	They	aim	at	providing	a	clearly-defined	method	of	describing	usage	of	the	common	good	in	media	debates,	by	combining	justifications	with	the	political	claims	analysis,	developed	by	Koopmans	&	Statham	(1999)	to	analyse	protest	events	and	political	claims	presented	in	them.	A	justification	is	the	use	of	orders	of	worth	to	back	a	claim	presented	in	a	public	discussion.	The	resulting	method	recognises	different	usages	of	justifications	(critique,	compromise,	claims-making)	and	different	types	of	actors	(NGOs,	individual	citizens,	states).	The	justifications	themselves	are	not	amended	significantly:	they	are	readily	available	and	usable	for	this	kind	of	analysis.	
From	justifications	to	engagements	to	grammars	After	On	Justification,	Laurent	Thévenot	focused	on	recognising	different	types	of	action,	and	how	they	relate	to	justifications,	public	discussion	and	political	action.	While	On	Justification	is	a	forceful	work,	some	types	of	critiques	and	actions	could	clearly	be	analysed	more	deeply	using	a	vocabulary	that	extends	beyond	the	common	good.	One	of	the	most	important	pointers	in	this	direction	came	from	the	comparative	work	Laurent	Thévenot	did	with	Michèle	Lamont	(Lamont	&	Thévenot	2000,	Thévenot	&	Lamont	2000	–	see	also	Thévenot	2014:9),	where	clear	differences	in	construction	of	the	public	good,	and	the	importance	and	legitimacy	of	individuals	and	their	preferences,	were																																																									4	I	do	not	want	to	push	this	point	too	far:	there	are	so	many	nuances	of	individual	polities	(as	they	are	called	in	On	Justification)	and	orders	of	worth	that	a	direct	one-to-one	correlation	is	not	easy	to	show.	I	argue	that	it	is	actually	not	necessary	either:	even	if	the	link	is	vaguer,	it	still	helps	us,	like	an	archetype,	to	see	how	argumentation	based	on	individual	interests	is	different	from	the	grammar	of	public	justification.		
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shown	between	the	US	and	the	French	polity	(Moody	&	Thévenot	2000,	Thévenot,	Moody	&	Lafaye	2000).	Justification	theory	is	focused	on	different	models	of	common	goods,	and	all	the	justifications	are,	by	definition,	collective.	Thus,	references	to	the	private	interests	of	the	actor,	though	numerous	in	empirical	situations,	cannot	easily	be	incorporated	into	justification	analysis	–	for	this	type	of	debate	is	not	always	about	monetary	worth	or	the	functioning	of	the	markets,	even	if	these	ideas	are	closely	related	to	the	concept	of	individual	interest.	 Thévenot’s	solution	was	to	present	three	types	of	cognitive	format	and	ways	of	engaging	with	the	material	world,	which	are	then	related	to	three	general	types	of	presenting	arguments	and	solving	conflicts,	called	grammars	(for	engagements,	Thévenot	2001,	2007,	and	for	grammars,	see	Thévenot,	2011,	2014,	2015).	In	this	section,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	pragmatic	regimes	of	engagements	(Thévenot	2001,	2007),	and	how	these	cognitive	models	become	social:	how	they	are	enlarged	to	matter	on	a	societal	level.	My	critical	re-evaluation	and	re-building	of	the	argument	is	focused	on	this	operation	of	enlarging.		Influenced	by	practice	theory,	Thévenot	developed	pragmatic	regimes	as	‘social	devices	which	govern	our	way	of	engaging	with	our	environment	inasmuch	as	they	articulate	two	notions:	a)	an	orientation	towards	some	kind	of	good;	b)	a	mode	of	access	to	reality’	(Thévenot	2001,	75).	Engagements	are	ways	of	relating	to	the	(physical)	world,	which	entail	how	the	actor	handles	information,	is	engaged	with	certain	objects,	and	the	good	that	is	best	pursued	by	doing	this.	Thévenot	(2001,	2007)	hardwires	certain	cognitive	modes	into	achieving	certain	kinds	of	goods.	As	there	are	multiple	goods	to	be	pursued	(familiar	enjoyment	of	the	surroundings,	intentionality	and	‘projecting	oneself	into	future’,	publicly	justified	principles),	there	are	also	multiple	ways	of	engaging	with	the	material	world.	The	idea	of	three	different	regimes	opens	the	possibility	of	different	criteria	for	valuation	(see	Lamont	2012).	So,	in	addition	to	the	cognitive	formats	and	relation	to	the	material	environment,	the	mode	of	evaluation	also	plays	a	crucial	role.	
On	Justification	presented	the	level	of	justifiable	public	action,	where	arguments,	people,	and	arrangements	are	general,	based	on	a	higher	common	principle	of	evaluation,	and	rely	on	the	concept	of	general	will.	This	level	is	by	definition	somewhat	abstract:	for	an	argument	to	be	based	on	common	goods,	the	great	majority	of	all	details	and	personal	
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attachments	have	to	be	left	out.	In	this	type	of	action,	or	argumentation,	there	are	no	places	for	intimate	arrangements	or	for	giving	special	attention	to	loved	ones	–	or	for	the	expression	of	pure	self-interest.	In	addition,	Thévenot	proposed	two	other	regimes	of	engagements	that	are	below	the	level	of	abstraction	of	the	regime	of	publicly	justifiable	action.	These	regimes	of	engagements	are	the	regime	of	familiarity	and	the	regime	of	planned	action.	I	shall	first	present	these	regimes,	and	then	engage	in	a	critical	re-reading	of	the	regime	of	the	plan.		In	the	regime	of	publicly	justifiable	action,	all	evaluation	is	based	on	abstract-level	common	good.	Action	is	‘oriented	to	the	demands	of	public	order’	and	‘evaluation	must	be	valid	for	a	third	party	and	characterized	by	generality	and	legitimacy’	Thévenot	(2007,	417).	The	central	elements	are	the	qualifications	that	people	and	assemblages	receive,	and	the	ordering	that	is	possible	because	of	these	qualifications.		The	regime	of	familiarity	is	on	the	‘lowest’	level,	most	intimate	and	most	dependent	on	the	personal.	The	central	good	is	familiarity	and	a	feeling	of	ease,	emotions	are	expressed	and	emotional	attachment	to	people,	objects,	and	places	are	cherished.	The	relation	to	objects	is	central	in	all	regimes,	but	it	gains	special	heft	in	the	familiar	engagement.	One	feels	at	ease	in	one’s	home	neighbourhood,	when	one	almost	intuitively	knows	where	everything	is,	has	an	emotional	attachment	to	many	of	the	objects	surrounding	daily	routines	(trees,	rocks,	little	nooks	and	crannies	in	paths),	and	constructs	personal	arrangements	(what	side	of	the	road	is	usually	taken,	which	coffee-shop	one	visits,	where	one	jogs).	Pleasure	is	derived	from	these	routines	and	habitual	actions.		For	the	third	leg	of	the	triad,	Thévenot	presents	a	regime	that	relies	on	intentionality,	conventional	action,	and	the	ability	to	fulfil	plans,	the	regime	of	the	plan.	This	was	meant	in	a	limiting	sense:	not	all	human	action	seeks	to	fulfil	specific	plans,	and	thus	individual	interests	(which	are	realised	through	such	intentionality)	are,	in	this	theoretical	context,	not	the	sole	or	overarching	goal	of	human	action.	They	are	in	focus	only	in	this	limited	engagement	(Thévenot	2001,	69-71).	It	is	the	way	of	engaging	with	the	world	that	aims	at	changing	the	status	quo.	In	the	regime	of	the	plan,	disputes	are	meant	to	be	resolved	through	brokering	deals,	and	in	a	kind	of	naturally	appearing	barter.	When	this	becomes	impossible,	and	disputes	appear,	a	switch	happens:	conventional	action	is	not	enough,	and	the	actors	start	referring	to	general	principles	to	solve	the	disputes.	The	regime	of	the	plan	gives	way	to	the	regime	of	justification.		
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For	Thévenot,	it	can	be	said,	these	regimes	of	engagement	are	hierarchically	ordered	in	two	different	ways:	they	exist	on	different	levels	of	generality	as	well	as	on	different	levels	of	publicity.	Public	justifications	operate	at	both	the	most	general	and	the	most	public	level.	Thus,	there	is,	in	addition	to	the	‘qualitative’	difference	(in	abstractness)	between	these	regimes,	a	kind	of	‘quantitative’	difference	(in	publicity)	as	well.	The	three	regimes	have	different	cognitive	bases,	and	different	goods	they	are	used	to	foster,	but	they	also	differ	in	terms	of	how	general	they	are.	It	is	not	only	that	the	regime	of	publicly	justifiable	action	is	based	on	general	principles,	it	is	also	that	it	is	explicitly	more	‘general’	–	in	the	sense	of	most	directed	towards	public	affairs	(Thévenot	2001:	66	&	79,	Thévenot	2007:	415-417).	This	conflation	of	generality	and	publicity	creates	the	inherent	problems	of	the	theory.	As	we	shall	see	from	empirical	research,	arguments	based	on	individual	interests	can	have	at	least	as	public	and	as	legitimate	roles	in	debates	and	disputes	as	those	based	on	general	interests.	
Generality	and	publicity	in	grammars	of	commonality	Next,	I	shall	take	a	closer	look	at	the	grammars	of	commonality,	at	how	these	engagements	are	generalised	from	cognitive	formats	to	ways	of	supporting	community	and	settling	disputes	in	the	public	sphere.	Despite	their	different	orientations	towards	the	public	(Thévenot	2007:417),	all	the	regimes	can	be	made	into	more	public	entities.	When	Thévenot	refers	to	the	public,	he	often	uses	the	word	commonality	(see	2015,	footnote	1),	precisely	because	the	regime	of	familiarity	does	not	easily	lend	itself	use	in	the	public	sphere	(in	the	sense	of	newspapers,	parliaments,	intellectual	discussions)	–	he	even	consciously	turns	away	from	using	phrases	like	‘public	space	of	communication’	(2014:16).	While	this	is	precise	and	analytically	forceful,	it	also	has	the	effect	of	highlighting	the	community-building	aspects	of	dispute-solving	over	and	above	the	kind	that	happens	in	complex	societies	and	mediatised	debates.	If	one	tries	to	create	a	version	of	the	theory	that	is	more	readily	operationalisable	in	public	democratic	discussions,	publicity	has	to	be	confronted	head-on.	Ylä-Anttila	and	Luhtakallio	(2016)	have	developed	the	grammar	of	public	justifications	into	an	analytical	tool	for	understanding	public	debates.	The	same,	in	a	way,	needs	to	be	done	for	the	other	two	grammars.5	 A	regime	of	engagement	is	transformed	into	a	grammar	of	commonality	in	the	
plural	through	communicating	–	that	is,	making	things	common	for	the	whole	community	–																																																									5	This	article	is	only	concerned	with	the	regime	of	planned	action	and	the	ensuing	grammar	of	liberal	individuals.		
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and	composing,	settling	conflicts	and	fitting	multiple	viewpoints,	interests	and	justifications	into	a	(more	or	less)	cohesive	whole	(Thévenot	2014;9,	2015:85).	When	engagements	are	enlarged	into	grammars	of	commonality,	rather	private	cognitive	models	of	thinking	are	transformed	into		communal,	and	political,	ways	of	evaluating	arguments	–	thus	creating	modes	of	valuation	(Centemeri	2014,	Eranti	2017,	Lamont	2012).	If	grammar	is	understood	as	a	mode	of	valuation,	it	is	also	a	system	describing	legitimacy:	the	operation	of	delimiting	between	the	valuable	and	the	not	valuable,	and	defining	precisely	how	valuable	things	are,	is	necessarily	done	based	on	some	kind	of	criteria.	These	criteria	end	up	defining	which	arguments	are	legitimate	in	a	grammar.	This	logic	opens	up	the	possibility	of	empirical	research	into	this	type	of	argumentation:	when	looking	at	which	arguments	are	seen	as	legitimate	by	the	actors	in	a	given	situation	or	context,	we	can	decipher	which	grammar	is	dominating	the	situation.		When	moving	from	the	personal	level	towards	the	public,	the	regime	of	familiarity	becomes		grammar	of	close	affinities,	which	is	a	delicate	matter:	how	to	communicate	these	private	arrangements	and	personal	attachments	in	a	way	that	is	meaningful	to	anyone	besides	the	speaker?		It	is	possible,	but	obviously	the	nature	of	the	public	sphere	(Habermas	1991)	severely	limits	these	possibilities	(see	Ylä-Anttila	2016).	Blok	&	Meilvang	(2014)	have	used	the	level	of	familiar	engagements	to	highlight	the	problems	political	actors	have	in	presenting	knowledge	created	in	and	relevant	to	the	familiar	format	and	using	it	in	public	discussion	in	the	context	of	local	land-use	disputes.	Lonkila	(2011,	also	Gladarev	&	Lonkila	2013)	has	a	fine	depiction	of	St.	Petersburg	park	activists	who	refer	to	particular	trees	as	their	brothers.	They	oppose	felling	the	trees,	not	because	of	the	abstract	principles	of	any	common	good,	but	because	the	trees	are	really	meaningful	to	them,	because	they	are	emotionally	attached	to	these	trees.	And	Ylä-Anttila	(2016)	shows	how	a	cultural	symbol	with	strong	emotional	resonance	can,	even	in	public	discussions,	be	appropriated	for	populist	political	use.	This	political	use	derives	its	power	precisely	from	this	strong	relationship	and	familiarity.		However,	as	mentioned	previously,	when	rising	above	the	cognitive	level	and	towards	the	general	level,	two	things	happen	simultaneously:	we	rise	in	terms	of	abstraction,	and	we	rise	in	terms	of	publicity.	The	effects	of	these	two	movements	are	different	for	different	grammars.	In	what	follows,	I	focus	on	the	regime	of	engagement	in	the	plan	and	the	
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liberal	grammar,	and	what	happens	to	them	if	we	rise	above	small	communities	and	look	at	them	from	the	perspective	of	the	body	politic	(or	some	other	larger	community).		
Engagement	in	the	plan	describes	aspiring	towards	goals,	choosing	the	means	of	reaching	those	goals,	‘projecting	yourself	in	the	future’	(Thévenot	2007).	The	basis	of	the	
grammar	of	liberal	individuals	in	public	(Thévenot	2011,	2014,	and	2015)	is	to	state	individual	interests	as	preferences,	in	such	a	way	that	any	actor	could	take	these	positions	(Thévenot	2015:90,	Cheyens	2011,	2014).	In	this	grammar,	Thévenot’s	notion	of	composing,	of	gathering	into	some	kind	of	whole	individual	interests	which	might	possibly	contradict	each	other,	is	most	relevant.	This	is	because	it	tells	us	what	disputes	and	conflict	resolution	between	such	preferences	are	like:	trades,	negotiations,	personal	items	pushed	aside.	They	are	expressed	as	individual	choices	or	interests.	Consequently,	criticism	is	only	allowed	to	a	lesser	degree.	‘The	integration	of	differences	is	achieved	by	negotiation	and	bargaining	between	“stakeholders”’	(Thévenot	2014:17).	This	grammar	clearly	grasps	something	relevant	about	public	goods	and	arguments,	especially	when	compared	with	public	justification:	not	all	arguments	build	on	an	
expressed	or	explicit	idea	of	the	common	good.	Some	people	are	publicly	only	worried	about	themselves	and	their	monetary	well-being,	while	other	people	value	deals	and	a	plurality	of	opinions	more	than	agreement	or	even	than	the	possibility	of	implementing	the	general	will.	Here	an	empirical	example,	taken	from	a	land-use	participation	case,	might	help.	In	land-use	disputes,	many	residents	of	the	contested	parts	of	the	city	are	explicitly	and	solely	concerned	about	their	own	properties	and	backyards	–	or	those	of	their	immediate	communities.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	following	quotation	from	Helsinki,	which	was	sent	by	a	resident	to	the	city	planning	administration	in	response	to	a	proposed	urban	change:	
If	all	of	[the	proposed	changes]	really	become	reality,	I	shall	pack	up	my	family	and	
move	to	greener	and	lusher	surroundings.	When	I	discuss	this	with	my	friends	here	
at	this	part	of	city,	they	all	say	the	same.	The	resident	sending	this	letter	is	clearly	taking	part	in	a	(semi-)public	discussion	–	but	justifications	are	nowhere	to	be	seen.	This	mode	of	making	direct	reference	to	the	individual	interest	of	the	actor	is	seen	as	less	general	than	referencing	common	goods,	or	justifications.	This	shows	in	Thévenot’s	own	comparative	work:	in	France,	individuals	and	references	to	
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individual	preferences	were	seen	as	illegitimate	in	public	discussion	(Moody	&	Thévenot	2000,	Thévenot	&	Lamont	2000).6	The	same	research	(ibid.)	also	shows	that	this	feature	of	legitimacy	is	not	universal.	In	the	US,	it	was	seen	as	a	completely	ordinary	way	of	presenting	political	claims.	But	even	there,	one	can	ask	when	reference	to	the	good	of	a	finite	number	of	people	turns	from	a	private	interest	to	the	common	good	(as	is	done	in	Moody	&	Thévenot	2000,	Thévenot	&	Lamont	2000)?	How	many	people	do	you	need	for	the	common	good?	In	land-use	disputes,	residents	routinely	argue	on	the	basis	of	their	own	interests,	and	even	that	of	the	neighbourhood	or	small	group	(see	Eranti	2017,	Richard-Ferroudji	2011).	So	here	we	have	a	problem	of	legitimacy	and	generality:	how	to	construct	legitimacy	that	is	not	based	on	common	
goods	and	the	general	will?	And	we	also	have	a	problem	of	representation	and	the	level	of	the	collective	actors:	in	public	discussions,	private	interests	are	often	used	as	the	principal	mode	of	argumentation,	that	is,	as	the	principal	grammar.	And	not	only	by	individuals,	but	also	on	the	part	of	collectives,	and,	even	more	often,	individuals	who	claim	to	represent	a	collective.		So	although	it	can	be	said	that	the	level	of	generalisation	is	higher	for	the	publicly	justifiable	action,	since	it	must	be	formatted	in	a	way	that	is	compatible	with	the	common	good,	it	would	be	quite	hard	to	show	that	argumentation	based	on	the	grammar	of	liberal	individuals	is	somehow	less	oriented	towards	the	public.		The	problems	with	hierarchical	levels	of	generality	become	visible	when	moving	from	dealing	with	cognitive	formats	to	dealing	with	public	(or	semi-public)	agreements	or	disagreements	–	when	moving	from	cognition	and	relationship	to	objects	to	arguments	made	in	the	public	polity.7	When	working	on	an	interactional	scale,	it	is	easy	to	see	continuous	normal	action,	planned	action	and	personal	interests	as	intimately	linked.	But	when	focus		is	broadened	to	a	more	generalised	arena,	the	link	between	unproblematised	‘normal’	action,																																																									6	Regarding	the	all-encompassing	nature	of	On	Justification:	of	course	all	arguments	possible	could	be	interpreted	as	being	somehow	about	the	common	good	–	voicing	private	interests	could	be	seen	as	tacitly	endorsing	market	worth,	or	only	being	a	different	mode	of	civic	justification	and	so	on.	This	however	comes	dangerously	close	to	sloppy	psychologising,	since	from	public,	written	sources,	we	would	be	hard-pressed	to	argue	that	a	certain	cognitive	process	was	behind	the	argumentation,	perhaps	even	unbeknownst	to	the	speaker	herself.	I	suggest	that	a	more	substantial	interpretation	of	certain	arguments	can	be	arrived	at	by	defining	them	in	different	terms,	and	that	the	categories	presented	in	On	Justification	are	better	utilizsed	if	they	are	used	only	as	references	to	the	common	good	(in	relation	to	the	concept	of	general	will.)	7	It	is	entirely	possible	that	these	problems	only	manifest	themselves	when	we	look	at	the	public	or	semi-public	level	of	politics,	and	do	not	present	themselves	in,	for	example,	ethnographic	research,	or	in	other	situations	more	directly	linked	to	individuals	in	cognitive	situations.	
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and	having	one’s	own	primarily	self-interest	in	mind	becomes	much	more	iron-clad	and	problematic	than	it	necessarily	should	be.	Despite	what	Thévenot	writes	(2015:	84),	this	move	can	have	precisely	the	effect	he	tried	to	avoid:	that	of	naturalising	the	link	between	private	interests	and	the	individual’s	normal	action.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																	When	we	move	on	to	analysing	participation	and	argumentation	on	the	level	of	society,	and	thinking	about	deliberative	democracy,	we	run	into	problems.	If	we	look	at	material	produced	by	citizens	using	established	participatory	channels,	such	as	the	example	used	in	this	article,	all	we	have	is	the	faintest	of	trace	of	thought-process,	the	words	trailing	on	the	paper.	A	researcher	cannot	postulate,	at	least	not	with	any	great	certainty,	the	mental	states	or	cognitive	formats	of	these	authors.	We	need	a	version	of	the	liberal	grammar	that	is	independent	of	ideas	of	cognitive	styles,	and	that	incorporates	the	notion	of	the	public	from	the	start.	 Thus	we	cannot	rely	too	much	on	the	(assumed)	regimes	of	engagements.	The	engagement	model	is	based	on	the	actor’s	own	internal	evaluation:	what	is	the	format	in	which	information	is	processed,	how	are	public	guarantees	used,	and	so	on.	But	we	have	to	base	our	analysis	on	external	factors	if	we	want	to	understand	what	is	actually	happening	in	the	world.	To	sum	up:	it	is	unclear	how	helpful	the	grammar	of	individuals	operating	in	a	
liberal	public	is	in	analysing	disputes	on	a	broader	level	than	in	local	community.	This	is	partly	because	of	the	problems	created	by	conflating	generality	and	publicity,	and	partly	because	the	criterion	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	argumentation	has	not	been	clearly	defined.	
The	grammar	of	individual	interests	In	what	follows,	I	present	a	reconstruction	of	the	‘grammar	of	individuals	in	a	liberal	public’	(Thévenot	2014,	2015),	contrasting	it	primarily	with	the	grammar	of	public	justification	and	its	model	of	the	common	good.	Since	this	theoretical	reconstruction	is	carried	out	in	order	to	develop	tools	for	analysing	democratic	participation	and	public	discussion,	examples	and	parallels	from	theories	of	deliberative	theory	and	participation	studies	are	presented.	When	viewed	through	the	regimes	of	engagement,	the	common	good,	constructed	by	utilising	the	general	will,	will	always	be	the	most	abstract	and	most	public.	From	the	point	of	view	of	democratic	participation	in	(possibly	mediatised)	disputes,	this	does	not	do	justice	to	the	specific	functions	of	the	grammar	of	individual	interests:	it	is	based	on	a	different	idea	of	how	the	common	good	(and	thus	the	general	will)	works.		
	 15	
It	can	be	said	that	in	the	grammar	of	public	justification,	the	explicit	aim	is	to	discuss	and	debate	foundational	ideas.	This	happens	by	referencing	common	goods	–	general	principles.	These	general	principles	always	argue	about	the	good	for	all.	This	might	not	be	exactly	the	same	as	arguing	about	the	general	will,	but	it	certainly	comes	close.	Thus,	the	
model	of	public	justification	is	a	model	of	deliberation:	situations	are	formulated	as	conflicts	between	different	public	goods,	compromises	between	them	are	made,	and	in	the	end,	the	polity	as	a	collection	of	rational	actors	comes	to	an	informed	decision	(conflicts	can	naturally	also	happen	among	common	goods	–	but	they	are	more	easily	solved	through	reality	tests).	It	is	implied	that	the	theoretical	model	for	this	decision	is	unanimous.	(Here	it	is	perhaps	useful	to	think	of	deliberative	democracy	in	terms	such	as	those	used	in		Polletta	2008,	or	Young	1996.)		 The	grammar	of	public	justification	is	linked	with	the	concept	of	the	sovereign:	deliberation	–	between	shared	formulations	of	the	common	good	–	is	about	finding	an	agreement	on	the	general	will,	which	then	works	as	the	basis	for	applying	sovereign	power.8	This	sovereign,	earlier	personified	by	the	monarch,	is	usually	an	abstract	description	of	the	state.	But	a	concrete	example	to	highlight	the	idea	of	the	sovereign	is	the	following:	within	urban	planning,	this	sovereign	power	lies	within	the	city	planning	authority.	It	ultimately	makes	all	the	decisions	in	city	planning,	in	conjunction	with	the	democratically	elected	councillors.	Thus,	the	residents	who	are	arguing	against	planning	changes	using	the	grammar	of	public	justification	are	trying	to	win	the	support	of	the	sovereign:	to	prove	that	their	position	is	what	is	good	for	everyone,	not	just	for	themselves	(see	eg.	City	of	Helsinki	2015).	In	the	grammar	of	individual	interests,	in	order	to	make	a	legitimate	claim,	an	actor	must	construct	a	subject	that	can	legitimately	argue	its	interests	–	and	then	nominate	herself	as	the	legitimate	representative	of	that	subject.	The	general	will	is	not	assumed	to	be	a	transcendent	property	of	a	sovereign	entity,	but	is	composed	of	all	the	individual	wills	–	all	interests	and	wills	are	legitimate	and	relevant	(cf.	Young	1996,	126-128,	Rosanvallon	2013,	274-276.).	Emmanuelle	Cheyns	has	shown	that	precisely	this	construction	of	the	legitimate	subject	is	also	where	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	can	fail,	when	the	legitimacy	of	the	actor	is	disputed	(2011,	2014).																																																									8	See	Rousseau	1762	for	The	Social	Contract,	discussion	on	it	in	On	Justification:	107-111,	Baczko	1988	on	the	social	contract	and	the	French	revolution,	Young	1996	and	Benhabib	1996	on	deliberative	democracy	contrasted	with	interest-based	or	aggregative	democracy,	and	Rosanvallon	2013	for	the	legitimacy	of	interest-based	democracy.	
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The	prototypical	case	of	subjects’	legitimate	interests	is	the	idea	of	the	referendum.		Without	any	regard	to	the	reason	or	justification	behind	individual	votes,	each	citizen	as	a	rights-carrying	subject	chooses	one	of	the	options	on	the	table,	and	the	idea	with	most	votes	wins.	In	a	referendum,	the	sovereign	acts	based	on	votes,	not	based	on	arguments.	The	deliberation	involved	is	a	separate	action	from	the	actual	decision	(see	Baczko	1988,	Young	1996,	120-121,	Rosanvallon	2013).	What	is	implied	is	the	legitimacy	of	differing	opinions	and	claims,	even	in	the	absence	of	justifications.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	level	of	generality	or	generalisability	is	necessarily	lower	than	in	positions	justified	using	orders	of	worth	–		and	at	the	very	least,	the	level	of	publicity	certainly	is	not	lower.	Whereas	the	generality	in	public	justification	comes	through	principles	–	arguments	are	always	about	what	the	common	good	is	–	the	
generalisation	in	the	grammar	of	individuals	could	be	said	to	come	through	the	construction	of	
the	subject	as	a	group	of	people	sharing	an	opinion.	While	the	general	model	is	based	on	the	idea	of	individuals	as	subjects	with	claims,	interests,	and	individual	wills,	these	subjects	can	also	be	constructed	as	larger	bodies	(Moody	&	Thévenot,	2000,	Self-reference	1).		The	difference	in	collectives	between	the	civic	order	of	worth	and	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	is	that	the	latter	operates	without	the	notion	of	supressing	your	own	will	for	the	good	of	the	collective	that	is	evident	both	in	the	civic	order	and	in	the	grammar	of	public	justification.	These	are	opt-in	communities,	communities	of	preferences.	The	legitimacy	of	this	kind	of	constructed	subject	is	an	interesting	question	that	is	explored	by	Rosanvallon	(2013),	and	is	not	pursued	further	here.9	To	show	how	these	subjects	are	created,	and	how	their	interest	is	argued,	I	shall	take	an	example.	In	the	comment	letters	sent	to	the	city	planning	authority	about	an	imminent	planning	change,	many	residents	of	Haaga,	a	neighbourhood	in	Helsinki,	constructed	‘the	people	of	Haaga’	as	the	de	facto	writer	of	their	comment	letters,	as	in	the	following	example:	
Hey.	I’d	like	to	express	my	opinion	on	this	matter.	Haaga	is	already	dense	enough	as	
it	stands.	Once	the	green	areas	are	refurbished	and	a	new	park	building	is	built	to	
replace	the	old	one,	it’s	enough.	(…)	And	we	don’t	want	more	traffic	on	our	streets.																																																									9	And	at	the	same	time,	the	rules	of	the	political	culture	are	not	identical	for	everyone.	While	Everyman	might	well	say	‘I’m	only	in	it	for	my	own	backyard,’	that	same	option	is	not	available	to	the	more	public	members	of	the	community,	such	as	politicians	and	representatives	–	at	least	not	in	same	capacity.	The	same	is	true	for	publicity:	it	might	well	be	that	we	hope	that	the	world	might	be	a	place	where	everyone’s	first	thought	would	be	for	the	common	good,	and	that	is	why	newspapers	and	public	officials	are	probably	expected	to	present	these	justifications	more	prominently.	
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The	implied	argument	is	that	‘the	people	of	Haaga’	is	a	political	subject	that	a)	can	legitimately	comment	on	whether	new	housing	should	be	built	in	the	forest	near	the	current	Haaga,	and	that	b)	the	opinion	of	this	subject	is	unanimously	against	the	new	development.	The	residents	were	able	to	represent	this	subject	in	the	media	and	act	as	a	unified	actor	in	opposition	to	the	plan.	(See	Alapuro	[2010]	and	Bourdieu	[1991]	for	analysis	of	this	kind	of	representation	among	political	actors	and	voluntary	associations;	this	constructed	representation	can	also	be	seen	as	an	act	of	dominance,	dispossessing	the	people	whom	the	actor	claims	to	represent.)	The	subject	of	‘people	of	Haaga’	is	inclusive,	but	with	two	conditions:	to	join	it,	one	must	1)	share	the	opinion,	and	2)	be	from	Haaga	(this	latter	is	not	as	strict:	membership	is	not	dependent	on	personal	experience	and	relationship,	as	it	would	be	in	the	grammar	of	close	affinities).	In	this	example,	this	subject	is	both	an	existing	thing	and	a	fiction:	these	subjects	overplay	both	their	popular	support	and	the	unanimity	of	the	people.	The	majority	of	the	‘people	of	Haaga’	have	not	participated	in	any	kind	of	discussion.	Since	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	general	will	is	a	sum	of	individual	wills,	all	individual	positions	can	be	legitimately	expressed.		Whereas	the	grammar	of	public	justification	requires	a	higher	common	principle	to	be	used	in	the	evaluation,	in	the	grammar	of	individual	interests,	small	groups	can	present	their	positions,	their	individual	wills,	and	still	be	treated	as	individuals,	not	collective	actors	in	the	sense	of	the	civic	worth.	Here	I	have	suggested	changing	the	name	of	the	grammar	from	grammar	of	
individuals	in	a	liberal	public	to	the	grammar	of	individual	interests.	There	are	two	main	reasons	for	this:	1)	the	new	name	would	omit	direct	references	to	liberalism.	The	connection	has	always	relied	more	on	implicit	divergence	from	certain	uses	of	the	word	than	on	explicit	engagement	with	the	(English-language)	body	of		philosophical	literature.	As	liberalism	can	be	found	in	many	forms,	it	would	perhaps	be	safer	not	to	carry	its	full	baggage	within	the	grammar.	2)	The	formulation	here	is	specifically	aimed	at	understanding	more	public,	more	deliberative	processes	than	cognitive/practice-level	processes.	
Grammar	of	individual	interests	in	action	One	of	the	greater	imbalances	in	the	sociology	of	engagements	has	been	the	differing	levels	of	explication	between	the	three	regimes	and	grammars.	Earlier	I	tried	to	show	how	we	could	think	about	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	as	both	legitimate	and	oriented	towards	the	
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public.	In	what	follows,	I	present	vignettes	about	what	the	grammar	of	individuals	is	on	the	substance	level.	Here	it	helps	to	think	of	it	as	a	cultural	repertoire	(Swidler	1986)	in	much	the	way	justifications	have	been	examined	(Silber	2003).	Rosanvallon	(2008:	25-26)	divides	suspicion	and	opposition	against	elected	or	otherwise	ruling	political	organs	into	two	main	branches.	The	first	suspicion	is	suspicion	of	the	ability	of	elected	or	chosen	leaders	or	planners	to	fulfil,	express	and	implement	the	general	will.	The	other	suspicion,	a	more	fundamental	form	of	what	he	calls	counter-democracy,	is	based	on	what	‘a	liberal	disbelief’	about	whether	the	general	will	exists	at	all	(ibid.).	The	central	idea	is	to	protect	the	individual	and	her	interests	against	the	central	planner	or	decision-maker.	This	is	one	formulation	of	the	grammar	of	individual	interests.	These	two	different	types	of	suspicion	have	been	said	to	be	exemplified	respectively	by	European	and	American-style	liberal	political	systems	(Moody	and	Thévenot,	2000;	Thévenot,	Moody	and	Lafaye,	2000,	Lamont	&	Thévenot	2000).	Within	the	urban	planning	literature,	the	NIMBY	(Not	In	My	Backyard)	argument	has	been	the	focal	concept	for	discussions	on	the	tension	between	the	common	good	and	private	interests.		The	(few)	examples	in	this	paper	also	come	from	this	literature.	Many	analyses	of	NIMBY	conflicts	are	rooted	in	the	idea	of	the	private	interests	of	individuals	(Freudenberg	and	Pastor	1992,	Gibson	2005,	Moody	and	Thévenot	2000,	Wolsink	2006).	Even	though	the	general	model	of	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	is	the	referendum,	negotiations	and	discussions	are	also	part	of	the	repertoire.	These	discussions	are	not	deliberations	on	the	relative	merits	of	common	goods,	but	rather	trading,	haggling,	and	the	presentation	of	individual	situations	and	subjectivities.	On	the	rhetorical	level,	the	actors	make	demands,	broker	deals	and	issue	ultimatums	rather	than	argue	about	principles	on	the	general	level	(Thévenot	2007,	2014,	2015,	Moody	and	Thévenot,	2000,	Thévenot,	Moody	&	Lafaye,	2000).	In	participation	in	city	planning,	planning	officials	see	the	value	of	comments	and	participation	by	individuals	for	providing	contextual	information,	or	subjective	opinions,	on	how	a	planning	change	specifically	affects	their	lives	(Bäcklund	2007	158-170).	Personal	opinions	and	individual	comments	are	valued	not	despite	their	being	personal	and	individual,	but	because	they	are.	Many	formulations	of	politicisation	(see	Luhtakallio	2012,	12,	170-190)	are	built	around	the	idea	of	a	rise	in	generality.	This	rise	in	generality	has	usually	been	seen	as	a	move	to	a	more	abstract	level,	and	that	has	usually	meant	moving	from	one’s	own	private	interest	
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towards	the	common	good.	Since	we	already	know	that	this	is	not	the	only	way	to	present	legitimate	political	claims,	we	shall	need	to	modify	the	thinking	around	this	rise	in	generality.	Luhtakallio	underlines	the	fact	that	‘the	recognition	of	the	possibility	of	conflict	is	central	to	politicisation’	(ibid.	186,	see	also	Palonen	2003:	an	issue	becomes	political	once	it	is	playable).	This	conflict	need	not	be	a	conflict	between	principles,	it	can	also	be	a	conflict	of	interests	(between,	not	within,	individuals).	Thus	we	could	enlarge	our	ideas	about	politicisation:	we	could	also	think	about	rises	in	publicity	(making	something	public,	making	preferences	or	principles	well-known	also	opens	issues	as	playable),	and	the	construction	of	political	subjects	(creating,	on	a	rhetorical	level,	communities	which	to	present	a	claims-maker	as	legitimate).	 To	sum	up:	in	the	grammar	of	individual	interests,	the	common	good	is	seen	to	rise	out	of	the	private	interests	of	relevant	actors	–	not	by	finding	a	single	good,	but	through	the	articulation	(and	contestation)	of	preferences	by	legitimate	actors.	The	actors	are	legitimate	if	they	are	able	to	present	their	preferences	as	if	drawn	from	a	publicly	available	pool	of	options.	These	actors	may	be	individuals	or	constructed	community-level	political	subjects.	In	public	discussions,	the	central	rhetorical	move	is	to	construct	the	interest-holding	actor	–	such	as	a	smaller	community	within	a	city	–	and	claim	to	represent	this	community.	These	are	opt-in	communities	of	preferences:	all	that	is	needed	for	membership	in	them	is	to	accept	the	interest	as	it	is	presented.		Since	these	interests	are	not	articulated	as	principles,	they	can	be	adopted,	discarded,	haggled	over,	and	eventually	compromised	(cf.	Polletta	2008).	
Conclusions	The	purpose	of	this	article	has	been	to	investigate	and	slightly	re-formulate	Laurent	Thévenot’s	theory	of	grammars	of	communality.	The	aim	was	to	end	up	with	a	theoretical	system	that	would	allow	research	on	public	discussions,	participation,	and	other	ways	through	which	democracy	happens	in	public	settings.	Its	main	concern	has	been	the	grammar	of	individual	interests,	which	I	argue	should	be	treated	as	being	potentially	as	public	as	the	grammar	of	public	justification.	I	also	suggest	that	it	would	be	more	fruitful	to	argue	that	the	level	of	abstraction	in	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	is	not	lower	as	such,	but	rather	that	the	abstraction	is	built	on	different	grounds.	This	helps	to	distinguish	between	legitimate	and	illegitimate	uses	of	the	grammar.	We	now	have	a	concept	of	how	democratic	discussion,	that	is,	conflict	resolution	and	goal-setting	in	a	complex	society,	might	work.	It	includes	three	possible	higher-level	
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scales	of	evaluation:	one	based	on	actors	pursuing	their	self-interest,	one	based	on	common	goods,	and	one	based	on	intimate	relations	between	people	and	the	material	world.	In	addition	to	this,	the	grammar	of	common	goods	is	defined	by	conflicts	over	the	very	definition	of	the	common	good,	conflicts	between	common	goods,	and	conflicts	over	measurement	within	the	common	goods.	Conversely,	the	grammar	of	individual	interests	is	defined	by	conflicts	between	generalisable	interests	of	individuals,	and	the	grammar	of	private	affinities	over	strong	emotional	attachments.	These	can	all	be	used	to	justify	political	positions,	even	though	the	term	‘justification’	has	been	reserved	for	situations	where	common	goods	are	referenced.	And	all	of	them	can	be	thought	as	(sets	of)	cultural	repertoires.	This	threefold	interpretation	of	justification	is	presented	in	table	1	below.	
	 Common	Good	 Individual	Interest	 Close	Affinities	
Grammar	of	
Communiality	
Multiple	common	goods	 Self-interest	of	actors	 Intimate	and	emotional	connections	
Defining	Conflicts	 1)	Over	definition	of	common	good	2)	over	situationally	relevant	common	good	3)	over	measurement	within	a	definition	
1)	Between	interests	2)	Over	construction	of	legitimate	collective	subjects	3)	over	representation	within	the	collective	
1)	Over	generalizing	private	attachments	2)	over	inclusion	into	community	3)	over	symbols	and	commonplaces	
Nature	of	the	
Community	
General	Defined	by	State	Humankind	 Opt-in	Preference-based	Ad-hoc		
Particular	Based	on	Familiarity	and	sharing	Exclusive	
The	argument	presented	here	does	not	radically	conflict	with	the	spirit	in	which	the	theory	of	grammars	of	commonality	is	written.	But	it	highlights	the	importance	of	the	idea	of	individual	interests	as	a	(somehow,	somewhere)	legitimate	mode	of	presenting	critique	–	at	least	in	a	pragmatic	way:	it	is	what	people	do.	Constructing	the	grammar	without	referencing	engagement	in	a	plan	also	highlights	the	idea	of	representation	and	political	(collective)	subjectivity	as	paramount	to	the	legitimacy	of	argumentation	in	the	grammar	of	individual	interests.	Thus,	it	may	forge	a	way	for	us	to	better	understand	the	pluralism	of	argumentation	and	the	pluralism	of	grammars	at	the	level	of	polity.		
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